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DOCTRINE IN A VACUUM:
REFLECTIONS ON WHAT A LAW
SCHOOL OUGHT (AND OUGHT
NOT) TO BEt
James Boyd White*
Although this paper will reach a wider audience, in it I mean
mainly to address the students and faculty of the University of
Michigan Law School. It is meant to be part of a conversation in
which members of this community talk to each other about the
life they share.
I have written elsewhere about the expectations-the fears
and hopes-that one can appropriately bring to law school. In
this paper I speak to those who are immersed in ·the process of
legal education, on one side of the podium or the other, and wish
to say something of what I think it is, and can be, all about.
THE CARICATURE

I want to begin with a common caricature of what legal education has become. This account is of course false as a description
of a particular course or a particular student, but it is widely
believed and has enough truth in it to make it worth paying attention to, if only as a cultural artifact. According to this version
of our experience, the first year of law school is a great success.
During it our students learn the basic methods of legal analysis:
how to read a case, a little about how to read a statute, how to
write legal memoranda and briefs, and how to take exams. From
the students' point of view, this year is exciting, often transforming. Pushed by your circumstances and yourself as perhaps
you have never been pushed before, you find resources you did
not know you had and discover yourselves undergoing a
profound cha_nge, from being bright young students_ to being
t
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bright young lawyers, ready to go to work in the world. You have
at last found something that you can actually do, and many of
you have summer jobs in which you learn that people are willing
to pay you for doing it. From the faculty's point of view, the
first-year classes are said to be full of life and questioning and
energy, a pleasure to teach. This is, after all, the moment at
which we help people move into our profession-in which they
become like us-and that is bound to be felt as confirming.
According to this caricature the first year is a glorious success.
It is followed, however, by two years of relative failure. For some
reason the courses seem to become boring and routine, and students lose interest and become passive. They focus their attention first on getting a job and second on learning the doctrinal
material that they think will prepare them in a practical way for
the world they are about to enter. The result, at its worst, is a
kind of contempt for the courses, for the theoretical conception
of law that their teachers seem to have, and for the intellectual
process in which they are themselves engaged. We see this in the
attempts by some students to turn our courses into bar review
courses, which can adequately be "studied for" by mastering a
Gilbert's Outline or some such "study aid." In the words of one
student (words that provide my title) on premises such as these
a law school education becomes a process of exposure to "doctrine in a vacuum." Classes that fit this stereotype are marked
by passivity or resistance, unconcern, inattention, and a kind of
disguised hostility on both sides of the podium.
Is this caricature true? Not in any easy sense, I believe, for, at
least in my experience, students at Michigan, including those in
the upper classes, have for the most part been intellectually engaged and open, receptive to expel'imentation, and both patient
and generous with my efforts in the classroom. And I see around
me a faculty whose intellectual liveliness, openness, and energy
scarcely fit the mold required by the caricature. But in another
sense the caricature is true, for even if it is descriptively false it
in some way represents a set of expectations against which both
faculty and students report themselves as having to struggle.
One hears both teachers and students talk as if the caricature
were real, and this in a way makes it real. I think, then, that it is
not an accurate picture of this law school but that it is an accurate picture of forces at work within the law school, perhaps at
work in each of us, and there is value in thinking about its origins and implications.
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THE CASE METHOD AND ITS COLLAPSE

To begin with the questions of origins, one common explanation for what happens in the last two years of law school is that
we are all, students and teachers alike, the victims of our success. In this view, what we call the "case method" of law teaching works very well when it is new and transforming, but by the
time it has been adequately mastered by the students, its use
becomes repetitive, boring, and routine. A wonderfully exciting
educational experience degenerates into a mechanical and empty
ritual that robs it of almost all value, a transformation in which
both sides are complicitous.
One might put it this way. In the first year of law school, the
student discovers that she will be responsible for reading the peculiar texts that define the law as she has perhaps never been
responsible for anything before. She must make sense of these
cases on her own, and from many points of view, and to do that
she must learn to pay attention of a new kind to the material
before her. Much of the life of her education lies in the process
by which she comes to see the text in a new way: to be read not
for the main idea or general principle, but reconstructively and
imaginatively; to be taken apart and put together again; to be
treated as a piece of the alien legal world in which she will
shortly have to make her way. The text is made to yield every
drop of evidence about that life that the imagination can make
it yield. What is more, the texts must be arranged in patterns of
significance, patterns that work surprising changes in the meaning of the individual texts themselves. This education works in
the first instance by directing the attention to a series of texts
and holding it there: making the texts the object of seemingly
unlimited questioning.
In this process, at least in its ideal form, the student is treated
not as a student, in the old-fashioned sense of one who is to acquire information, but as an active mind, presented with difficulties she must address herself, to which there is no "answer." At
the best, she is treated as a composer, a maker of compositions,
as one who must use the disparate materials of legal discourse to
create meanings for herself, and for others. She must do this
under the guidance not of some external figure, some set of right
or wrong answers, but of her own developing sense of autonomy
and capacity and responsibility. When this works well the student feels that in learning law she is engaged in something truly
important and that her teachers feel this way too. Indeed, what
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could be more important than learning to engage the mind at
that point where intellect and power meet to face the perpetual
question of what justice should mean? When it works well, the
student feels a related sense of ethical significance as well: that
learning to be intelligent, scrupulous, and creative in the service
at once of one's client and of the larger community is to acquire
a character worth having, one's own version of the character of
the trustworthy and competent lawyer. (This is, at its best, what
the classroom drill about precision and accuracy in stating facts,
holdings, and so forth, is really about.) The heart of this education is learning to be responsible in a new way for what one
thinks and says. You have to make sense of it all yourself, for no
one can do it for you. You have to think for yourself in circumstances forever new, to reach conclusions for which you are responsible, to decide for yourself what is worth saying and what
is not. This constitutes an active education, a learning-to-do, not
a passive acquisition of knowledge; when it works well, it tests
the limits of your mind and imagination.
At the end of the first year, or perhaps during it, everything
seems to shift, and the negative version of law school I described
above seems to come into existence (or, for some, simply into
prominence). Like the ideal account of the first year, this version
is not in any simple way "true," but it does seem to catch some
of the feelings that many people have, at least from time to
time. What can explain this shift?
One important change, I think, is that our relation with our
students shifts as we become their examiners. We score and rank
their performances on tests. For at least half of the class-the
bottom half-which has never been near the bottom half of anything in its life, this is a dreadful experience. As they struggle to
improve their performances, students in this situation often discover both that the standard law-school examination tests a
rather limited range of abilities and that substantial improvement on that measure may not be possible for them. This discovery is likely to lead them to think that improvement of their
minds in other ways is not possible either (in law school at least)
and that they must accept a lower rank in the world, and in
their own esteem, than they had hoped or expected. This is a
serious blow. It frequently results in a decision to wait out the
whole process of law school, looking forward instead to the new
competitive tests that life itself will offer. Sometimes it results
in a kind of basic demoralization. The disappointed student is in
fact caught in a serious dilemma: he can not change his position
in the hierarchy but he cannot reject it either-for to reject it
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would also be to reject much of what his remaining self-esteem
paradoxically rests upon, i.e., wonderful grades in the past, present status at a high prestige school, and so on. Those who do
well on these exams are from a long-range point of view not very
much better off, for they are invited to have a rather exaggerated sense of what their capacity to perform on these tests actually means: about their minds, about their need for a more general and thorough-going education, and about their likely
success in the world.
In fact, we all know that examinations of the traditional sort
do test for certain capacities of mind (and to some degree for
certain qualities of character as well-industry for example) and
that one can properly take a certain pleasure in doing well, a
certain disappointment in doing badly, on such tests. But both
the pleasure and the disappointment should be far more severely
qualified than they usually are, because we also know that these
tests do not test everything that matters, nor, by a very long
· shot, everything that matters in the practice of law; and that the
purely competitive impulses stimulated by such tests are a very
poor basis upon which to rest a professional life, or professional
satisfaction.
Why, then, does grading have such powerful effects on morale,
if I am right that it does, and why is it so difficult for students to
qualify their sense of satisfaction and disappointment in a realistic and appropriate way? Perhaps partly because the faculty
really believes (or seems to believe) much more deeply in grading than it claims; perhaps partly because employers use (or
seem to use) grades so rigidly in hiring; and perhaps partly because the examination process offers almost no information to
the student beyond a grade. And other factors no doubt contribute to the change too: the cumulative effect of a kind of teaching
that is intolerant of error (when everyone knows that the freedom to make mistakes is important to learning, essential to invention); the increasing sense that the faculty's claims (of which
this article is one) to be interested in "process" or "thinking like
a lawyer," not in the "rules," are in practice undercut, even rendered hypocritical, by our anxieties about "coverage" (which are,
after all, not explicable in any language we speak to our students); the deadening effect of the repetition of our standard
law-teacher moves, such as putting the burden of proof on another and remaining "sceptical" or "unpersuaded"; the loss of
our own sense that what is at stake in our subject, and in our
classes, is the nature of justice and the good community; our evident enjoyment of our position of power, not to say of infallibil-
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ity, in the classroom; and the increasingly apparent divergence
between our own careers and those for which our students are
for the most part preparing. Whatever the reason, one is often
told that there is a felt transformation in the later years, with
far-ranging consequences.
The case-method, for example, is likely to be seen no longer as
a method of exploration and dialectic, a technique for discovering what is problematic in the law or in life, but as a way of
distancing oneself from that-a way of reducing experience to
the level of the Gilbert's Outline. The implied contract between
the student and teacher shifts its focus: our insistence to the
student that "You are responsible for these texts as you have
never been responsible for anything in your life" all too frequently becomes the acceptance of a correlative, "and responsible for nothing else in the world." The focus on discrete texts,
and the chain of texts, which is the key to the concentration of
attention in the first year, thus becomes a focus on doctrine in a
vacuum. Such a class-I speak now of my own experience, as
student and as teacher-is likely to proceed by plowing through
a casebook at just the wrong speed, with just the wrong attitude:
too fast to engage in real analysis of the cases or questions
presented, too slowly to function as an overview. The teacher
eagerly accepts responsibility for the running of the class-after
all, this is his professional performance and he prides himself on
his skill and showmanship-and the students cheerfully acquiesce in this assumption, and agree to praise one teacher, or
blame another, for this performance, almost as though he or she
were a TV actor. "Good teaching" becomes related to the entertaining way one can "get material across." The student can reduce the course to the black-letter law, either through hornbook
or the more laborious method of reading the cases; the teacher
cannot prevent it and his examination in any event seems to ask
for nothing that a bright student cannot provide on the basis of
hornbook reading.
Law school on such terms trivializes law and education alike.
The traditional case-book form often reinforces this trivialization, for it presents severely edited opinions as if they were all
that one needed to know, and often does the same with other
writers as well-a paragraph each from Bentham, Kant, and
Plato, for example. The whole thing feels to some like a charade,
a complex way of doing something that is at heart rather simple
and unimportant. For me the core of the evil lies in the definition of poles and relation: the definition of the teacher as the
powerful and knowledgeable manipulator; of the student as a
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kind of child or infant, without any responsibility beyond preparing for a routine examination; of the material as legal rules
and principles embedded in cases or statutes. Legal education
seems no longer to be learning to think like a lawyer but learning to think like a bar exam. Or so many of our students feel.
That our students are our partners in this reduction of law
school (and of themselves) you can see if you imagine for a moment the outcry that would result if a class were told that it ·
would be examined on something not "covered" in class. (And
listen to the way the word "pass" is often uttered, as if it were
an accepted move in a game, like a bid at bridge.) Many teachers respond to this by becoming lecturers, a form of teaching
and of life that has its own rewards.
Is

THE CARICATURE TRUE?

I have presented a caricatured view of law school life with
what may seem to the reader a constant shifting of signals as to
whether I think it is "true" or not. Those shifts have been deliberate because I think the caricature is in a sense both "true" and
"false." Certainly no first-year class lives up to the ideal and one
hopes that no course in the later years fits my negative description either. For some students the sequence may well be reversed: first year may seem empty or trivial, mere game-playing,
the later years full of useful substance. Certainly the faculty at
this school offers a wide range of courses that in substance and
method vary greatly from the stereotype; and by all accounts
many of the most successful courses are among the most "traditional." And let me repeat that my own experience of students
here has been very satisfactory indeed. What is true is that
many of us carry something like this image in our mind. I think
the reason is, as I said earlier, that this image expresses forces
we feel at work, in our classes and ourselves. To some degree
there are obvious causes: the newness of first year cannot continue into the second; large class size, which permits first-year
case analysis, may inhibit more suggestive, exploratory, or inventive methods of teaching in the later years; students' concern
with employment becomes increasingly dominant, and it is natural that their attention will be to some degree diverted from a
present intellectual life to an unlived future; and ranking by
grades, as I suggested above, is a powerful blow to many,· who
take the rest of their work in a state of mind my colleague Rick
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Lempert calls a "mental pass-fail." If attention is elsewhere, education cannot go on.
IMAGINING ANOTHER VERSION

Can we imagine, or see around us, another sort of law school,
in which the students go on from the first year not to contract
but to expand their sense of responsibility for what they learn?°
In which they are offered courses that they can see as doing
something other than presenting doctrine in a vacuum-courses
in which the teacher need not be afraid of Gilbert's, or some
other aid, but actually encourages the use of whatever will help
the student, because the teacher is confident that the course she
gives, and the examination she offers, cannot be reduced to that
level? In which students are spoken to-and welcome it-as if
they had intellectual lives and agendas of their own, backgrounds and futures that are not fungible?
Imagine what it might be like to teach a graduate course in
British nineteenth century history, for example: we would not
assume that everything that counted would be said or referred
to-"covered"-in. class, but rather that the class would treat a
set of questions, chosen for their interest and importance, as examples of the historical mind at work. The students would be
assumed to know much more, and to learn much more, about
this period and its history than was ever said in class. Bibliographies too large for any one to read would be circulated. The idea
would be that each student was different; each was engaged in
an educative process for which he was responsible; that each
would be tested, not in a single examination, but by a comprehensive examination which would reveal his own pattern of
strengths and weaknesses, and ultimately by the profession, by
the quality of work that he could show that he could do across a
lifetime. Such a history course would not teach facts or themes
or doctrine in a vacuum: it would take place in a context, partly
of the student's making, including prior reading, contemporaneous reading and independent thought, and an imagined future
intellectual life. Could law school work on such premises, such
relations?
The object of this analogy with the (no doubt idealized) history course is to suggest that one can see what goes wrong in law
school by thinking about another kind of triadic relation between the teacher, the student, and the material. Can we find a
way to teach that recognizes that our students' capacities and
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virtues are different from one another? That we ourselves have
different things to teach? That the subject "law" is not the same
in every classroom any more than the subject "history" is? And
can the students find a way to assume more responsibility for
their own education, conceiving of themselves as engaged in a
project that has its own interest and importance to them, independent of its significance as pre-license training? Can their education be seen as truly a liberal education, i.e., as the development of their own individual capacities, not as a training into a
sort of sameness? Put slightly differently, can we come to see
that the law that we teach, and that we hold out as entitled to
respect and authority, is not a set of rules to be learned but a set
of ways of thinking and talking and acting together about questions of justice, a method and a community which it should be
our task to exemplify and constitute?
The starting point would be to conceive of legal education not
as professional training alone but as the education of the individual mind. In such an education, courses would not be reducible to the bar review, to the outline, or to the set of rules-to
the doctrine taught-for the subject of the courses would not be
"material" in that learnable sense, but rather the mind of the
student (and also, though it perhaps reveals a professional secret
to say so, the mind of the teacher) in relation to that material.
The materials of law would be contextualized by being made the
object of individual thought, the character of which was the true
subject of attention. This of course makes hard and practical
professional sense, for the most valuable attainment that a student will carry with her from our law school into the great world
is not intellectual baggage in the form of boxes and trunks full
of rules, distinctions, arguments, and so on, but a more fully educated mind. And her mind is also the organ by which she will
claim to find or make meaning in her life-including moral
meaning-, the organ by which she will organize her own experience into a coherent and tolerable whole. The most "practical"
education is perhaps not the most theoretical one, certainly not
the most academic; but it is the most intellectual education one
can obtain or imagine.
Her mind is trained, of course, in a specific professional context-it is the language of the law, not of medicine or linguistics
that the law student learns to understand, to recast, to remake,
and this part of the training is also important. But this fact is
secondary: the kind of knowledge with which a true education is
concerned is never repeatable data, but a knowledge that entails
a use or activity-a knowledge of practice that is a kind of ac-
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tion, including a kind of invention or creation. The practice of
law is not the application of doctrine learned in law school to the
facts of a client's case, for in one's practice the doctrine must be
learned-and that means rethought, reconstructed-over and
over again, from many points of view. What you learn in law
school is not law in the sense of repeatable propositions but how
to learn law-that is, how to do it and how to make it. In an
important sense "the law" one studies is thus the law that is
actually made in the classroom, made out of the materials of
case and statute, as the class thinks and talks about particular
questions. A good law school is thus a school of law-making.
This means that the proper focus of attention is not on what the
student is learning to repeat or to describe but what she is learning to see and to do; on the doctrine or language of the law not
abstracted from experience, but embedded in it, as the object
and medium of thought, expression, and intellectual action.
The moment of speech is the moment of our attention. Once
you start rattling off those cliches your mind is running in a
channel from which it will not easily shift, and so is the mind of
your interlocutor, and that part of the world which you have the
power to make, and the responsibility for making, becomes immeasurably poorer. Yet a moment of true speech by an individual voice speaking to others as they actually are about the facts
of the world-at such a moment, whether in a poem or a legal
argument or a classroom, the world is reborn.
The moment of speech, when knowledge is made active, is a
moment that calls for art (rather than science or technology) because the circumstances to which one speaks are never those to
which one has spoken before. The new lawyer is surprised to discover that in practice no case ever comes to him as a clean-cut
paradigmatic case, but always has uncertainties, ambiguities,
rough edges, and paradoxes built into it. This is so because the
case comes from life, not from the exposition of a theory, and
these are the qualities of actual human experience. To deal with
the fact that circumstance and culture constantly change, the
mind must have not a grid of established moves but the capacity
to invent new moves. Lessons and advice wear quickly thin; no
science exists upon which one's cognition of the world can rest;
the only possible guide is internal, a kind of gyroscope that enables the vessel to maintain stability and direction in a world
that is entirely fluid, and relative, without external
landmarks-the capacities of an Odysseus, confident that he can
meet a new situation with intelligence by focusing on what it
actually is.
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In this kind of legal education the student is defined not as a
learner of facts and doctrines and rules, nor even as the learner
of a set of rhetorical moves-of the means of persuasion available to the lawyer-but as a speaker and writer, the maker of new
compositions. Attention is focused on what the student can find
(or make) to say, and upon the resources and limits of his mind
and his language. 1
This conception of the student is inherently egalitarian. If two
people speak to each other as composers they must speak as fellow composers; no imaginable relation other than equality can
exist between them, for they share a situation that is at root
identical and they focus their attention on what is common in
their lot and life. To conceive of the student as composer is also
to recognize his autonomy and individuality, for composition is
of necessity an independent act done by individual minds. The
student who learns to compose in legal language learns something of his own responsibility for what he does; of his own
strengths and weaknesses; of his own place in the world. At best
he makes a voice of his own: not a private voice, not the voice of
any-person-talking-as-a-lawyer, but a voice of his own as a lawyer. In my own view, indeed, that could be taken as the central
aim of a legal education.
This sort of education is also a kind of moral education, for it
is a training in the responsibilities of the self that resists the
contemporary tendencies towards nihilism and authoritarianism
alike. The lawyer is trained to recognize and respect authorities
external to the individual will or whim: the authority of the law
and the authority of the experience of other people. This training takes place in the constant establishment of community with
others-clients, other lawyers, judges-and in the maintenance
of the language by which community itself is defined and made
possible. From this point of view the true significance of legal
education-what makes it worth doing for the student and for
the teacher alike-is that it is inherently antibureaucratic and
antiauthoritarian: it insists upon the reality both of the individ1. Of course legal composition is of a special kind, for much of it is based upon interpretation, the working out of competing or alternative meanings for various authoritative
texts-statutes, common law cases, constitutions-both alone and in connection with
each other. The legal analyst thus is always saying: here is the set of relevant texts (recognizing that any one inclusion or exclusion may be challenged) and here is the meaning
that each should have, that they all should have, the meaning that makes the best sense
of each taken alone and of all taken together. The result is a composition, a way of
making sense and order of the material of the world. This is true not only at the level of
analyzing legal texts, but also-perhaps more obviously-at the level of the organization
of facts, the constitution of reality in negotiations, trials, and conversations.
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ual person and of the community at large.
GIVING "DOCTRINE" A CONTEXT: AS A LANGUAGE

One way to describe the effect of this kind of education is that
it gives doctrine a context, a context internal to the student and
the teachers. The language of the law is not regarded as a discrete entity, a world of its own, but as a language that must be
used-and remade-by this individual mind or that one, functioning in one actual or imagined situation or another. The rules
are not studied as though they were of interest in themselves
but as the material for speech in real or imagined circumstances.
This focus of attention leads directly to the mind's sense of itself, to its nature, to its cultural circumstances, to the possibilities and limits of speech and understanding, to the recognition
of others similarly situated, and so on. This conception of law as
an expressive and rhetorical activity is not reducible to learning
how to manipulate doctrine, as the lawyer's life is so often
thought to be. It is not enough to move sentences about ori the
page of the mind in shifting patterns, inserting "nots" and
"buts" in new places, recasting the materials of the cases, and so
on. The mind must be a source of its own energy, of invention,
of what the rhetoricians called ingenium: the power to make
something new. This has at least two sides: the power to ask new
questions of the world, of the client and the witnesses and the
files-to ask questions that will generate new material; and the
capacity to organize it all in new ways, as a new story, with its
own starting point, direction, movement, and ending-to recreate or represent the world in language.
How is the power of invention to be stimulated? Partly by repeatedly presenting the problems the lawyer faces as problems
for speech and argument, for individual responsibility and judgment-this will bring to bear the students' ordinary-life capacity
for speaking and judging, for inventing, in new circumstances.
Partly by our own writing and speech: can we find ways to write
as law teachers which meet the standards I suggest, of showing
our individual minds at work in a professional literature? But
perhaps most by an explicit resistance to the assumptions upon
which the caricature I described above necessarily rests.
The first assumption that should go is that everything of importance in the field, or for the exam, will be covered in class.
We should feel free to treat our students as grown-ups, able to
read and think on their own. This means we should give them
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books and articles they might read before the course begins (and
perhaps even examine them on that reading as a kind of qualification for the course); we should identify material we expect
them to read on their own during the course, including casebook material; we should offer them guidance to useful summaries of doctrine and the like. This would enable us to proceed at
a pace slow enough to make some real progress in analyzing particular texts or sequences of texts and to make the way we engage with those texts, not their "substantive content," our true
subject. We could be more explicitly exploratory, self-reflective,
and critical. But this would also require us to give up the claim
that we "teach it all," or that our courses are necessary for passing a bar exam. (We should actually welcome the proliferation of
bar review courses, for they make it easier for us to make clear
to our students that our job is different from that one.) It may
seem impossible to do the kind of work we and our students are
ready to do in classes as large as those we currently teach. This
sense of frustration, if real enough, might lead to some changes
in class size. In the interim, we should think about doing some
kinds of teaching to huge classes in order to make another kind
of teaching, to smaller classes, also possible.
GIVING "DOCTRINE" A CONTEXT: BY COMPARISON

So far I have suggested that doctrine can be given a context
by being regarded, in any course, as a language that the student
must learn to use, and to remake, in individual cases. The context is that of the mind faced with its own limits and those of its
resources, and this kind of context-making could go on in any
course, if teacher and student took the time and paid the attention necessary to it. But there is another kind of contextualization that may both give legal doctrine meaning and encourage
the development of the capacity for invention, one that would
require a new course or set of courses: this is the study of intellectual analogies to law. If we can contrast legal language, legal
methods of thought, and legal communities with others, we may
gain an insight and purchase that will make invention and reform more thinkable and possible. One field of analogy, already
suggested, is ordinary life: in talking about contracts we should
not forget, and we should invite our students to remember, what
we know of promises and expectations in ordinary life; likewise,
when we talk in the criminal law of "blameworthiness" or "desert" we should remind ourselves of our own practices of blam-
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ing and judging of desert; when we think about "vagueness" we
should think about what makes expressions clear and unclear in
ordinary life; and so on.
Another source of analogy is the field defined by other intellectual disciplines. The object of the kind of study I have in
mind would not be that the lawyer would acquire the "insights"
or "information" generated by other experts, but that we would
study the intellectual activities that others engage in and contrast them with our own. Not law and sociology for example, or
law and history, but law as each of these: what kind of sociology
does this court unwittingly practice, what kind of history? What
are the other possibilities for thought and expression, suggested
by the practices of historians and sociologists, that the law
should consider? What is truly distinctive about law? Similar
questions can be asked of other activities: anthropology, literature, economics, philosophy, and the like. These contrasts and
comparisons, like those with ordinary life, should suggest new
possibilities for thought and argument, new analogies upon
which to draw in inventing lines of thought and speech. This is a
different view of interdisciplinary work from the usual models,
for each of the disciplines would be looked at as I suggest law
should be looked at: with an eye to its special resources and to
its limits as well. An important consequence of this kind of
study is that it would bring to the center of consciousness, where
they could be studied and criticized, the assumptions underlying
the culture of law, and of our larger culture, enabling law better
to perform its functions of cultural criticism and transformation.
Let me give just one example of what such a study might take
as a specific subject. I have from the beginning of this paper
been describing something called law school, or this law school,
in a way that I have marked as uncertain or unusual by calling it
a caricature. I have said it is partly true and partly false: perhaps it is true in the way a myth or an ideology is true, or true
as an expression of feelings of anxiety or fear-perhaps momentary feelings, perhaps structural ones. But it is also false: as an
account of this course, this faculty, this student body. And certainly my account has been less than satisfactory to me and I
suppose to you. What is the truth of it? What special kind of
truth may such a caricature have in general? Here we face aversion of a question that is present whenever we speak as lawyers
(or as law professors) about our world-about what happens
when "cops" arrest "suspects," for example, about the fear of
crime in our cities, about the nature of progress (or the reverse)
in our treatment of the environment, or civil rights, or labor jus-
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tice, or the securities markets. What would good sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, economists, and historians say
about the caricature I have given you? What questions would
they ask? What story would they tell?
I have said that doctrine should be removed from its "vacuum" and placed in a "context," and you may wonder why I
have not suggested, what many would think obvious, that we
place it in the context of the "real world." My point here is that
there is no one "real world" which can serve as a context, but a
variety of often wildly differing constructs of reality. The. process by which we and others create social realities is the central
subject of such a course or program as I describe.
When this emphasis is combined with the conception of legal
education as legal literacy described above, something else flows
from these comparisons: recognition of the individuality of our
sources of meaning and authority. In a course such as I describe
we could not aim, any more than the historians could aim, for a
single view of what law is and of its relations to all the other
disciplines; each student, and each teacher, would have to draw
his or her own connections and make them vivid and persuasive
in compositions of his or her own. If carried over to the field of
formal legal writing, it would mean the end of dead and inauthentic references-like Chief Justice Burger's reference to
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, 2 made as if the reference were to his own reading and that of his audience, and like
the dreadful canned history that appears in many opinions and
briefs, reflecting no work by the writer, no knowledge of history,
no engagement in the process of historical judgment, but a simple cut-and-paste job from other texts-as if all learning could
be reduced to the model of universally available and comprehensible precedents. If it worked well, this sort of training in analogous disciplines would create a group of voices speaking authentically about the analogies they drew; and it would further break
down the stereotype that authority is dead and universal, rather
than living and recreated on the page.
How might this be done, practically speaking? One possibility
would be to start with an experimental voluntary second track
of legal education in the third year (or perhaps the second and
third year) which would be explicitly organized to create a different relationship among teacher, student, and material. The
aim would be the contextualization of doctrine: internally, by
recognizing it as a language that one must learn to use; and ex2.

See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 284 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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ternally, by attention to analogous disciplines. Such a program
could have a central core course, devoted to the comparison of
legal and other disciplines; the teaching of doctrine through lecture and reading; the careful exploration of a small number of
cases, viewed as the occasion for the discovery of the resources
and limits of legal speech; all with the idea of developing a sense
of autonomy, individuality, competence, responsibility, and a capacity to invent. This might especially attract students who are
academically inclined, but I think it would also prove its value
as purely professional training. Certainly it would do so if it increased the students' sense of the importance and interest of
what they were doing in law school and thus drew their attention to their present lives, away from their future ones; if it
broke down the sense, in faculty and students alike, that we are
engaged in an intellectual routine; if it seemed to build upon
rather than repeat the first year; and if it seemed in some sense
to be about the character that a just community, and a trustworthy lawyer, should have.

